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What do internal capital markets do? Redistribution vs.
incentives
Abstract
In this paper we explain the apparent diversiÞcation discount of conglomerates without
assuming ineﬃcient-cross subsidisation through internal capital markets. Instead we assume
that an internal capital market eﬃciently redistributes scare resources across a conglomerates
divisions between successive production periods. The need for redistribution arises from the
fact that resources may sometimes be produced by divisions which happen to be successful
in an earlier production stage but which do not have the best investment opportunities in
future production stages.
In contrast to the existing literature we consider explicitly the incentive problem between
corporate headquarter and divisional managers using a standard Moral-Hazard framework.
We show that although a complete incentive contract can be written bi-laterally between
headquarter and divisional managers, the redistribution of resources across divisions creates
additional agency costs in a conglomerate.
Moreover, assuming that no complete contract can govern the interim redistribution policy
by the headquarter, we show how the agency problem with divisional managers constrains
headquarters interim redistribution to be ex ante ineﬃcient.
JEL-ClassiÞcation codes: G31, G34, L23
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1 Introduction
The main economic eﬀect that our paper aims to capture is that of a classical capital budget-
ing process within a conglomerate. There a scarce resources and the conglomerates board
of directors, i.e. corporate headquarter, has to decide which of the conglomerates divisions
should be allocated those funds knowing that not all projects can be funded. We show that in
a conglomerate the reallocation of scarce resources and the provision of incentives to produce
those resources are intricately linked.
It has long been argued informally that the reallocation of scare resources is one of
the most important tasks for corporate headquarter: In many respects, this assignment
of cash ßows to high yield uses is the most fundamental attribute of the M-form enterprise.
(Williamson (1975), p. 147f, our italics) or The most critical choices top management makes
are those that allocate resources among competing strategic investment opportunities. (Don-
aldson (1984), p.95, our italics). Lamont (1997) and Shin & Stulz (1998) provided evidence
that conglomerates indeed do redistribute resources using an active internal capital market.
Although internal capital markets play an important role in conglomerates, there is a
puzzle. At Þrst sight it seems possible to argue that an internal capital market adds value
due to its information advantage over external capital markets (see for example Alchian
(1969), p. 349) The argument however is at odds with evidence that conglomerates destroy
value ( Lang & Stulz (1994), Berger & Ofek (1995), Comment & Jarrell (1995)). They
typically trade at a discount compared to a portfolio of stand-alone Þrms which replicates
the conglomerates operating divisions.
An explanation of the conglomerate discount in terms of internal capital markets is that
corporate headquarter instead of distributing resources towards the most productive divisions,
ineﬃciently cross-subsidizes them ( Scharfstein (1998), Scharfstein & Stein (2000), Rajan
et al. (2000)).1 The reason why internal capital markets are ineﬃcient, these papers argue,
is that they are captured by managers and directors to Þght power struggles over the control
of the conglomerates resources.
The empirical evidence supporting the cross-subsidisation, or corporate socialism, hy-
pothesis however has recently come under some criticism. Chevalier (2000) shows that one
can replicate the evidence that is cited in support of corporate socialism by looking at Þrms
that are going to merge in the future but which are not integrated yet. Without integration
there cannot be cross-subsidisation to explain the evidence. Maksimovic & Phillips (2000)
shows that there are no signs of ineﬃcient cross-subsidisation when more micro-level data is
used than what is usually done.
Our paper shows how the conglomerate discount can be explained without assuming
ineﬃcient cross-subsidisation through ineﬃcient internal capital markets.
Suppose that we have a conglomerate with an eﬃcient internal capital market, i.e. cor-
porate headquarter, which owns the production assets of the conglomerate, allocates scarce
resources to the most productive division. Moreover, it is possible that a division that has
performed well in the past may no be the most productive division in the future. The internal
capital market serves to channel scarce resources between production periods from previously
successful divisions to divisions that will be successful in the future.
There is one more important task for corporate headquarter beyond channelling scarce
resources across divisions during production. Corporate headquarter lacks the skill of running
production assets and therefore has to employ managers to run the divisions. Since divisional
managers dislike hard work, they have to be induced to work hard through appropriate
incentive contracts. The other important task for corporate headquarter then is to hire
divisional managers and design their incentive contracts.
1There is a large literature on the diversiÞcation discount not based on internal capital markets. For
references, see Villalonga (2000).
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Our main result is that there are costs of running an internal capital market although
there is no ineﬃcient cross-subsidisation as such.2 Firstly, the possibility of reallocating
resources within a conglomerate increases the cost of inducing divisional managers to perform
well. Secondly, a reallocation of resources leads to an ineﬃcient continuation of investment
projects. And thirdly, a reallocation leads to an ineﬃcient transfer of funds.
Our main assumption is that corporate headquarter can bi-laterally write complete incen-
tive contracts with each divisional manager but there is no complete, multi-lateral contract
that governs the corporate headquarters decision of how to channel scarce resources across
divisions. The inability of Þxing ex-ante, i.e. before managers decide whether to work hard,
which division looses its resources and which division gains new ones, is at the root of the
second and third cost of running an internal capital market: ineﬃcient continuation and
transfers.
As far as we are aware there is no other paper that analyses the working of internal
capital markets and explicitly considers managerial incentive contracts. Managerial pay is
a variable in our model as opposed to a parameter like in the ineﬃcient cross-subsidisation
literature. There, managers mechanically receive an unspeciÞed private beneÞt that is in
Þxed proportion to the funds they control.
Eﬃcient internal capital markets were Þrst analysed by Stein (1997) but his model neither
considers managerial moral hazard nor are funds reallocated between production periods.
Brusco & Panunzi (2000) have a model that is similar in spirit to ours since they consider the
impact of a reallocation of funds on managerial incentives. In substance however, their model
is quite diﬀerent. Firstly, there is no explicit incentive contracting problem. They use the
private beneÞts framework where managerial pay-oﬀ is exogenous. Secondly, headquarter
does not reallocate funds since productive divisions happen to be poor in resources but
because headquarter discovers new information about the productivity of divisions. Thirdly,
in their model the manager of the more productive division has more incentives to work
hard. In our model, he has less incentives to work hard. Fourthly, they do not consider the
constraints on headquarters decision to continue divisions and transfer funds at the interim
stage. And Þnally, they use a model speciÞcation that makes the conglomerates total value
independent of managerial eﬀort.
Section 2 introduces our model of a two-divisional Þrm that operates for two production
periods. In order to highlight the role of an internal capital market in our set-up, section
3 takes a step backward and analyses the Stand-Alone benchmark case when there is no
internal capital market. Section 4 then examines the case when there is an internal capi-
tal market. Section 5 shows that there is a conglomerate discount when the productivity
diﬀerence between divisions is neither too large nor too small. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a Þrm that operates for two periods and that is composed of two divisions and
a headquarter. The headquarter (the principal) owns all productive assets but it has no
expertise in managing them. Hence, it employs two self-interested managers (the agents) to
run the divisions and it controls them through incentive contracts. If divisional managers
work hard in the Þrst period, they positively aﬀect their divisions performance at the end of
the Þrst period. At that interim stage, the headquarter can then decide what to do with a
divisions resources. The headquarter can either decide to continue a division for the second
period, it can liquidate its assets or it can transfer its assets to another division. In other
2This means that if the diﬀerence in productivity across division is weak then corporate headquarter may
Þnd it optimal to take resources away from weak divisions and give them to strong divisions. It does not
mean that corporate headquarter deliberately gives resources to weak divisions.
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words, the headquarter can operate an internal capital market between the two production
periods. Figure 1 illustrates the sequence of events.
In our set-up all parties are risk-neutral and the risk-free interest rate is normalised to
zero.
t= 0 t= 1 t= 2 tim e
H e a d q u a rte r  g i ve s
in c e n t i ve  c o n tr a c t s
to  d i v i s i o n a l m a n a g e r s
In te rm e d ia te  c a s h
f l o w s  a r e  r e a l is e d
H e a d q u a r te r d e c i d e s
w h e th e r to  re fi n a n c e
o r  to  l iq u i d a te  d iv i s i o n ( s )
C o n t in u e d  d iv is io n s 
in ve s tm e n t  p ro f its
a r e  r e a l is e d .
A ll d iv is io n s  a r e  liq u id a te d
t= 0 .5
D i v i s io n a l m a n a g e r s
e x e r t e ffo r t  to  in f lu e n c e
th e  su c ce s s o f  th e ir
d i v i s i o n
F irs t pro d uc t io n  p er io d S e c o n d  p ro d u c tio n  p e r io d
Figure 1: The timing of events
2.1 Production technology in a division
Production takes place for two periods. The higher the eﬀort put in by the manager of
division i, the better the interim performance of his division at the end of the Þrst period.
More precisely, it he exerts a high eﬀort eh then with probability p the division is worth 1 and
with probability (1− p) it is worth nothing. If he exerts a low eﬀort el then with probability
q < p the division is worth 1 and with probability (1 − q) it is worth nothing. Exerting a
high eﬀort costs the manager c while exerting a low eﬀort costs him nothing.
There will be production in a division for a second period only if 1 unit of resources is
reinvested at the interim stage between the production periods. If a division continues to
operate for a second period then it yields a Þnal value of γiα for sure. Hence, the ex-ante
expected value of a division that is continued and where the manager works hard is pγiα. Note
that the division has a positive Net Present Value (NPV) in the second period if γiα > 1.
The divisions production technologies are independent in the sense that division is pro-
duction technology does not depend on division js production technology and a divisional
managers eﬀort only aﬀects the performance of his own division.
Note that α, as opposed to γ, is not indexed by i: α represents common productivity
across all divisions while γi which represents the extra proÞtability of division i. Except for
γi all divisions possess the same production technology.
2.2 The internal capital market
Suppose for a moment that the headquarter does not have the possibility to redistribute
resources at the interim stage between the two production periods. In that case, each division
must rely on its own resources in order to be reÞnanced and to continue production for a
second period. If a division was successful in the Þrst period and produced 1 unit of interim
resources then this 1 unit can be used to reÞnance and continue the division to yield a Þnal
value γiα. Alternatively, a successful division could be stopped and its interim resources be
liquidated for their full value of 1. It is eﬃcient to reÞnance a division if it has a positive
NPV in the second production period, i.e. if γiα > 1.
If in contrast a division was unsuccessful in the Þrst period then there is no choice. In
the absence of any interim resources of its own, a division must be stopped even though it
may be very proÞtable in the second period.
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Both divisions succeed Only division 1 succeeds Only division 2 succeeds Both divisions fail
continue both continue 1, stop 2 stop 1, continue 2 stop both
continue 1, stop 2 stop both stop both
stop 1, continue 2
stop both
Table 1: No internal capital market: possible strategies
Both divisions succeed Only division 1 succeeds Only division 1 succeeds Both divisions fail
continue both continue 1, stop 2 stop 1, continue 2 stop both
continue 1, stop 2 stop both stop both
stop 1, continue 2 stop 1, continue 2 continue 1, stop 2
stop both
Table 2: Internal capital market: possible strategies
Table 1 summarises the headquarters possible actions between the production periods in
the case of two divisions when it cannot redistribute resources. The four contingencies that
the headquarter must consider are given in the title row. Each column shows which actions
are possible. For example, if only division 1 has succeeded then, without an internal capital
market, division 1 can be stopped or continued but division 2 must be stopped.
If the headquarter does have the possibility to redistribute resources at the interim stage,
i.e. if there is an internal capital market, then it is possible to reÞnance and to continue
a division that was unsuccessful in the Þrst production period. For example, even though
division 1 was not able to generate resources on its own it can still be reÞnanced if headquarter
transfers resources from division 2 to division 1. This requires that division 2 was successful
in the Þrst production period and that division 2 is then stopped and liquidated.3 We assume
that there cannot be partial liquidation or partial continuation. A divisions resources are
just enough to reÞnance another division.4
We have deliberately introduced the notion of indivisibility since it captures the fact that
in a capital budgeting process, corporate headquarter has to make decisions between various
mutually exclusive alternatives. For example an R&D project can only be brought to the
production stage if the production plant is built. If the plant is not built then all the budgeted
money is available to other projects. If the plant is built then the money is not available.5
Table 2 summarises the headquarters possible strategies when there is an internal capital
market. The diﬀerence to case without an internal capital market is that we add a possible
action in the cases when only one division succeeds. Headquarter can now stop the successful
division and continue the unsuccessful one. If both divisions have a positive NPV in the
second production period then it is eﬃcient to transfer resources from division 2 to division
1 when the latter is more proÞtable, i.e. when γ1 > γ2.
At the beginning of the Þrst production period the divisions are already endowed with
resources and all the resources that are redistributed between the Þrst and the second pro-
duction period are internally generated. There is no access to external capital market in our
3For simplicity we assume that there is no diﬀerence in liquidating inside an internal capital market or
outside it. Furthermore, in both cases it is possible to liquidate eﬃciently. Gertner et al. (1994) however
sees eﬃcient liquidation as one of the main advantages of an internal capital market as opposed to liquidation
through an external investor, say a bank.
4If there were some cash left on the table at the interim stage we would complicate our model without
gaining additional insights. Alternatively one could for example assume that all free-cash is paid out to
shareholders.
5Diﬀerent decisions by corporate headquarter will result in diﬀerent incentive constraints for it at the
interim stage between production periods. This insight is lost if we assume that capital budgeting is a
perfectly divisible process.
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set-up.6,7
2.3 Information and contracts
Headquarter has no expertise in managing production and therefore has to employ self-
interested managers. To control their behaviour and to compensate them for their costly
eﬀort, it gives them incentive contracts at the beginning of the Þrst production period. Since
divisional managers eﬀort is not observable, their incentive contracts cannot be directly
contingent it. In other words, there is a Moral-Hazard problem at the divisional level.
The incentive contract for divisional manager i speciÞes two payments. If his division is
reÞnanced for a second production period he receives a share δi ∈ [0, 1] of the Þnal liquidation
proceeds γiα at the end of the production process. A managers division can also be liquidated
at the end of the Þrst production period no matter whether the division has succeeded or
failed. Since we impose that all contracting parties are protected by limited liability, a
divisional manager cannot receive anything if his division is liquidated after failing in the
Þrst period.8 In that case there are no liquidation proceeds. If his division is liquidated after
succeeding in the Þrst period period he receives a share Wi ∈ [0, 1] of the 1 unit of interim
liquidation proceeds.
The form of incentive contracts is therefore quite simple. The share δi represents a
continuation reward, for example a wage or a bonus, and the share Wi represents a form of
severance pay or golden parachute that the manager receives when his division is liquidated
although it has been successful.9
Interim cash-ßows are observable but not contractible. Since headquarter owns productive
assets, it possesses the residual controls right over them. Therefore, it is the headquarter
which uses the internally generate resources at the interim stage as it sees Þt. Were interim
cash-ßows contractible then there is no need for corporate headquarter to operate an internal
capital market since it could write a comprehensive contract with all divisions that speciÞes
which division is reÞnanced under which circumstances.10
There is no asymmetric information between headquarter and divisional managers (and
among divisional managers) beyond their individual eﬀort levels. In particular, the second
period productivity of each division, γiα, is known to everybody. This means that headquar-
ter will be able to operate an eﬃcient internal capital market by channelling funds to more
productive divisions.11
Finally, we assume that there is no conßict of interest between the owners of the Þrm and
corporate headquarter. Headquarter maximises the total value if the Þrm net of incentive
payments to managers. Managers however do not care about the value of the Þrm, they are
6This is for simplicity only. All we need is that resources are scarce. If we want to be more explicit, we
could for example argue along the lines of Stein (1997) and say that access to external capital markets is
limited due to asymmetric information.
7Models that consider the role of internal capital markets in relation to external Þnance are Scharfstein &
Stein (2000) and Inderst & Mu¨ller (2000).
8That limited liability imposes a zero payment in one of the contingencies creates a standard moral-hazard
problem although all parties are risk-neutral.
9Note that a divisional managers incentive contract only depends on the performance of his own division.
What we eﬀectively assume is that a conglomerate does not use more complicated incentive contracts than a
one-divisional Þrm. We come back to this crucial issue in section 6
10If interim cash-ßows were contractible one could also write much more complicated incentive contracts.
So far, the incentive contracts only require that liquidation and its proceeds are veriÞable. For a discussion of
these issues see section 6.
11In contrast, Stein (1997) assumes that divisional managers have superior information and that the task
for the headquarter is to elicit that information. In Brusco & Panunzi (2000) headquarter receives a signal
that informs him about the productivity of divisions. In Inderst & Laux (2000) the productivity of divisions
itself depends on managerial eﬀort.
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only interested in the incentive payments they receive.12
3 No internal capital market
In this section we concentrate on the case when there is no internal capital market to re-
distribute resources. Initially we consider a one Þrm with one single division i in order to
illustrate the moral-hazard problem between the headquarter and the division manager and
to show how the incentive contract written by the headquarter interacts with its decision to
continue or stop a division. We Þrst present a First-Best situation where eﬀort is contractible
and then look at the Second-Best situation where eﬀort is not contractible. We also introduce
our Stand-Alone benchmark for the remainder of the analysis by asking: what is the value
of a portfolio of two independent single Þrms with one division each.
The section also introduces some assumptions that make the analysis of the case with an
internal capital market more tractable.
3.1 A single Þrm with one division: First Best
Suppose for a moment that the eﬀort level of a divisional manager is contractible so that there
is no moral hazard. The aim of this section is to illustrate the constraints on headquarters
behaviour at the interim stage between the two production periods.
If division i was successful and has generated 1 unit of resources in the Þrst production
period, then headquarter can either continue or liquidate the division. As the decision is
not contractible, headquarter continues the division if and only if its continuation value
Ci(δi) ≡ (1− δi)γiα exceeds its liquidation value Li(Wi) = 1−Wi at the interim stage:
Ci(δi) ≥ Li(Wi)⇔ (1− δi)γiα ≥ 1−Wi (1)
It is clear that by choosing the continuation reward δi and the golden parachuteWi headquar-
ter not only compensates divisional managers for their eﬀort, but also modiÞes its decision
to continue or liquidate a successful division.
Let us now go through both possibilities, continuation and liquidation, bearing in mind
that eﬀort is, for the sake of this section only, observable. In other words, headquarter can
just tell his divisional manager whether to work hard or not. Consider Þrst the case when
the headquarter wants to liquidate a successful division so that the relevant payment to his
manager is the golden parachute Wi. If headquarter imposes a high eﬀort then it just pays
enough to so that his manager is indiﬀerent between working for the Þrm and quitting, i.e.
until his Participation Constraint binds: pWi = c. Headquarter Þnds it optimal to liquidate
a successful division at the end of the Þrst production period iﬀ
Ci(δi) < Li(
c
p
)⇔ (1− δi)γiα ≥ 1−
c
p
We see that by choosing a suﬃciently large continuation reward, for example δi = 1, head-
quarter can always commit itself ex-ante to liquidate a successful division at the interim
stage.
Headquarter wants to impose a high eﬀort when it is more proÞtable than a low eﬀort,
p(1− cp) ≥ q ⇐⇒ p− q ≥ c, i.e. when the marginal beneÞt of high eﬀort exceeds its marginal
cost.13
12This is diﬀerent from models in the private beneÞts tradition. There both headquarter and managers
are interested in value maximising. Ineﬃciencies there typically arise from the fact that each party wants to
maximise the value of his own realm.
13Should the headquarter still want to liquidate a successful division but impose a low eﬀort on his manager
then it need not pay him any golden parachute Wi = 0. Again, headquarter can ex-ante commit to liquidation
with δi = 1. The expected beneÞt to headquarter of these actions is q.
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Consider now the case when headquarter wants to continue a successful division. Now
the relevant payment to his divisional manager is δi. If headquarter imposes a high eﬀort
then it just needs to satisfy the managers Participation Constraint, pγiαδi = c. Headquarter
Þnds it optimal to continue a successful division iﬀ
Ci(
c
pγiα
) ≥ Li(Wi)⇔ (1− c
pγiα
)γiα ≥ 1−Wi
Headquarter can commit itself ex-ante to continue a successful division by paying a very
large golden parachute, for example Wi = 1. It prefers to impose a high eﬀort on its manager
when the divisions second period NPV exceeds the ratio of marginal cost to marginal beneÞt,
pγiα(1− cpγiα) ≥ qγiα⇐⇒ γiα ≥
c
p−q .
14
The following proposition states that in the First-Best case in a one-divisional Þrm, head-
quarter continuation decision is eﬃcient. Without divisional moral-hazard managers work
hard when the marginal beneÞt of high eﬀort exceeds its marginal cost.
Proposition 1 When managerial eﬀort is contractible then a single division is continued iﬀ
it has a positive NPV for the second period, γiα ≥ 1. Headquarter always imposes a high
eﬀort on the divisional manager when the marginal beneÞt of high eﬀort exceeds its cost,
p− q ≥ c.
Proof. In the appendix.
The intuition for proposition 1 is that since headquarter can perfectly commit itself ex-
ante, it pays the manager the same in expectation in both the liquidation and continuation
case. Hence, the ex-ante decision to continue or liquidate is identical to the eﬃcient interim
decision.
To have an interesting problem we will assume that the headquarter wants the manager
to always exert a high eﬀort in the First Best benchmark.
Assumption 1 The marginal cost of high eﬀort exceeds its marginal cost: cp−q < 1.
The First-Best continuation reward contract then is, δFBi =
c
pγiα
.
3.2 A single Þrm with one division: Second Best
If eﬀort is not contractible then there is moral-hazard at the divisional level. Instead of
imposing the desired eﬀort level, headquarter must now induce it through appropriate incen-
tive payments. Again, we have to consider both the continuation and the liquidation case
separately.
If headquarter wants to continue a successful division and wants the manager to exert
a high eﬀort then the continuation reward δi must be incentive compatible, i.e. with that
reward the divisional manager must indeed prefer to work hard than to not work hard:
pγiαδi − c ≥ qγiαδi (2)
Headquarter pays the least possible amount δi =
c
(p−q)γiα . The amount is higher than the
corresponding payment in the First-Best case and therefore satisÞes the Participation Con-
straint with slack. Since the manager can no longer be told what to do, the manager must
expect to get some share of the production surplus.
Headquarter Þnds it optimal to continue a successful division iﬀ
Ci(
c
(p− q)γiα
) ≥ Li(Wi)⇔ (1− c
(p− q)γiα
)γiα ≥ 1−Wi
14The incentive payments for the low eﬀort and continuation case are δi = 0 and Wi = 1 so that the
expected pay-oﬀ to headquarter is qγiα.
8
so that headquarter can again commit itself ex-ante to continuation with a very large golden
parachute, e.g. Wi = 1.
15
If headquarter wants to liquidate a successful division and wants to induce the manager
to work hard, then it must pay an incentive compatible golden parachute, pWi − c ≥ qWi.
Headquarter pays the least possible amountWi =
c
p−q which again leaves some of the surplus
to the manager. It is easily veriÞed that again headquarter can perfectly commit ex-ante to
liquidation by δi = 1 for example.
The impact of eﬀort not being observable is most clearly seen in the liquidation case where
production ends after the Þrst period.16 In the liquidation case headquarter Þnds it proÞtable
to induce a high eﬀort if p(1− cp−q ) ≥ q ⇐⇒ p−qp ≥ cp−q . In contrast to the First Best case,
having the marginal beneÞt of a high eﬀort exceed its marginal cost is no longer suﬃcient to
ensure a high eﬀort. Instead, it must be that the ratio of marginal cost to marginal beneÞt
must be smaller than the relative impact of a high eﬀort.
As in the First-Best case, we can show that the headquarters continuation decision is
eﬃcient. What changes when eﬀort is not contractible is that it is more diﬃcult to induce a
divisional manager to work hard.
Proposition 2 When managerial eﬀort is not contractible then a single division is continued
iﬀ it has a positive NPV for the second period, γiα ≥ 1. The headquarter always induces a
high eﬀort level from the divisional manager when ratio of the marginal cost of high eﬀort to
its marginal beneÞt is smaller than relative impact of a high eﬀort, cp−q ≤ p−qp .
Proof. As in proposition 1
The second part of proposition 2 is a standard Moral-Hazard eﬀect. The Þrst part is sur-
prising since one often encounters models where Moral Hazard leads to ineﬃcient liquidation
(e.g. Bolton & Scharfstein (1996)). The diﬀerence is that headquarter can, as in First-Best
case, perfectly commit itself ex-ante and that headquarter pays the manager the same (in
ex-ante expectation) in both liquidation and continuation. Hence, the continuation decision
is not distorted.
To keep the subsequent analysis tractable we reduce the set of possible outcomes. First
we assume that the headquarter always wants to induce his divisional manager to work hard.
Thus, we strengthen assumption 1 to say:
Assumption 2 The ratio of the marginal cost of high eﬀort to its marginal beneÞt is smaller
than relative impact of a high eﬀort: cp−q ≤ p−qp < 1.
Second we assume that divisions always have a positive NPV for the second production
period.
Assumption 3 A division always has a positive Net Present Value for the second production
period: γiα > 1.
The consequence is that we are left with just one outcome when there is no internal capital
market. The manager always works hard in the Þrst production period and his division is
continued for a second period if and only if it is successful. The Second-Best continuation
reward is δSBi =
c
(p−q)γiα . The managers expected proÞt is p
c
p−q and headquarters proÞt,
i.e. Þrm value, is
Vi = pγiα− p
c
p− q (3)
With these preliminaries we proceed to introduce our benchmark against which we mea-
sure the value of the conglomerate.
15A high eﬀort in the continuation case is more proÞtable for headquarter if pγiα(1− c(p−q)γiα ) ≥ qγiα⇐⇒
γiα
p−q
p
≥ c
p−q .
16Remember that there is a moral-hazard problem only in the Þrst production period.
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Figure 2: The Stand-Alone benchmark
3.3 The Stand-Alone benchmark: two Þrms with one division each
In order to establish whether the ability to redistribute resources across divisions of a con-
glomerate creates or destroys value, we need a benchmark. As in the empirical literature, the
benchmark considers the value of portfolio of focused Þrms.17 The previous section showed
that under assumptions 1, 2 and 3 a single Þrm with one division is worth Vi = pγiα−p cp−q ).
Since we will only consider a conglomerate with two divisions i = 1, 2, we simplify γ2 to 1
and γ1 = γ. Our divisions are identical so that we can assume without loss of generality that
γ ≥ 1. The parameter γ then describes the extra productivity of division 1 over division 2 in
the second production period.
The value of a portfolio of two independent Þrms with one division each is
V SA = V1 + V2 = pγα+ pα− 2p c
p− q (4)
The Þrst term in (4) describes the expected beneÞt from production in Þrm/division 1 over
two periods, the second describes the expected beneÞt from Þrm/division 2 and the third
term describes the expected cost of inducing two divisional managers to exert a high eﬀort.
Figure 2 illustrates the Stand-Alone benchmark in term of the overall productivity (α)
and the extra productivity of Þrm/division 1 (γ). In the shaded area γ and α are such that
both divisions have a positive NPV in the second production period, γα ≥ 1 and α ≥ 1, and
division 1 is weakly more proÞtable, γ ≥ 1. The shaded area depicts the set of admissiable
parameter values.
4 The conglomerate with an internal capital market
In this section we develop the model when there is an internal capital market, i.e. when
headquarter can redistribute resources across its two divisions between the two production
17The diﬀerence is that in a theoretical model we do not have to worry about a possible selection bias.
10
periods. Adding an internal capital market has two consequences. First, we add strategies
for the headquarter at the interim stage (this was illustrated in table 2). This means that
if the headquarter wants to continue only a successful division, i.e. replicate the Stand-
Alone outcome, then it must not only prefer continuation to liquidation but it must also
prefer continuation to transferring resources to another division. Hence there will be further
constraints on the incentive contracts headquarter can write.
Second, divisional managers will anticipate in the Þrst period that there may be a redis-
tribution of resources across divisions at the interim stage. A manager will have diﬀerent
incentives to exert high eﬀort if he knows that he will be refunded only if he had success or
if he knows that he will be refunded no matter what or if he knows that he will never be
refunded.
4.1 Autarkic divisions
We now explore the Þrst consequence of adding an internal capital market, i.e. what are
the constraints headquarters behaviour at the interim stage? In order to avoid the second
consequence, i.e. the incentive eﬀect on managers we ask: when can a conglomerate replicate
the Stand-Alone outcome and attain the benchmark value V SA? In replicating the Stand-
Alone outcome, each division will be autarkic and managers act independently so that their
incentive problem is identical to the Stand-Alone benchmark.
Given that the productivity of division 1 is common knowledge, headquarter may a prior
have an incentive to redistribute funds to division 1 which is more productive. By assuming
for a moment that headquarter keeps divisions autarkic, we explore a pure negative eﬀect
due to the possibility of operating an internal capital market in this section.
If the conglomerate would never do worse with autarkic divisions there would be no point
in continuing our analysis of a conglomerate discount.
4.1.1 Implementation constraints
There are four contingencies that the headquarter can encounter at the interim stage. Either
both division succeeded, or just division 1 succeeded, or just division 2 succeeded or neither
division succeeded. The four cases correspond to the columns in table 2. In each case the
headquarter has various choices shown in the rows of the table. In order to implement a
certain redistribution policy, in this case the policy of no redistribution, the corresponding
choice must be the preferred one. So when both divisions succeeded then headquarter must
prefer to continue both divisions to the other three possible choices. Formally, it must be
that
C1 +C2 ≥ C1 +L2 (5)
C1 +C2 ≥ C2 +L1 (6)
C1 +C2 ≥ L1 + L2 (7)
The Þrst inequality says that headquarter must prefer to continue both divisions to just
continue division 1 and stop division 2. Similarly, the third inequality says that headquarter
must prefer to continue both divisions to stopping both.
When only division 1 succeeds then the headquarter must prefer to continue only division
1 so that
C1 ≥ L1 (8)
C1 ≥ C2 −W1 (9)
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The second inequality says that proÞt from continuing division 1 must be weakly greater
than the proÞt from continuing division 2 after compensating manager 1 whose division is
stopped.18
When only division 2 succeeds then the headquarter must prefer to continue only division
2 so that
C2 ≥ L2 (10)
C2 ≥ C1 −W2 (11)
In fact, we only need to consider the last four inequalities since together they imply the
Þrst three inequalities. What counts are those contingencies in which there is a potential for
redistribution, i.e. those in which only one division succeeds. Conditions (8) and (10) are the
continuation constraints that we also encountered in the previous section where there was no
internal capital market. What is new is the presence of the transfer constraints (9) and (11).
If headquarter wants to implement a policy of no redistribution at the interim stage, then
the two incentive contracts for the divisional managers, (δ1,W1) and (δ2,W2), must satisfy
those four constraints.
Even though divisions are autarkic, the mere possibility of transfers links the divisions
via the transfer constraints to be not too dissimilar. Since the net continuation proÞt Ci
is a function of the incentive payment the manager receives when his division is continued,
δi, there is now an important externality between the redistribution policy and incentive
contracting.
4.1.2 Managerial eﬀort
Given that the headquarter does not redistribute resources at the interim stage, how does a
divisional manager behave in the Þrst production period? In the absence of any redistribution
each division is autarkic so that each manager behaves exactly as in the case without any
internal capital market. For example, the manager of division 1 exerts a high eﬀort only if it
is proÞtable for him to do so, i.e. when
pγαδ1 − c ≥ qγαδ1 (12)
If the manager works hard then he incurs the cost of eﬀort c and with probability p the
division succeeds so that he is paid a fraction δi of the continuation pay-oﬀ γα. If he does not
work hard then he does not incur the cost of eﬀort but only gets the continuation payment
with probability q.19 Note that the performance of division 2 does not aﬀect his incentives,
(12) is identical to (2) which described the incentive constraint for a Þrm with one single
division. The following proposition summarises the behaviour of divisional managers when
the internal capital market is inactive.
Proposition 3 In a conglomerate with autarkic divisions the managerial incentive problem
is as in the Stand-Alone benchmark. It costs the same to induce a high eﬀort from divisional
managers and they behave independently from each other.
Figure 3 illustrates the managerial incentive problem under autarky. It shows the eﬀort
of both managers (e1, e2) as a function of the payment δi each manager receives if his division
18There are many more possible choices that we do not present explicitly. For example, the headquarter
could also stop both divisions and use the resources from division 1 to pay the manager of division 2 W2. Such
awkward possibilities are not optimal given our assumption of the positive Net Present Value of each division.
The headquarter always wants to continue successful divisions.
19Given assumptions 2 and 3 we can focus on the case where the headquarter wants the manager to work
hard and where the headquarter wants to continue divisions iﬀ they were successful.
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is continued. The payment threshold beyond which they exert a high eﬀort is the same as in
the Second-Best case: δ1 =
c
(p−q)γα , δ2 =
c
(p−q)α . Moreover, manager is payment threshold is
independent of whether manager j exerts a high eﬀort or a low eﬀort.
1
1
δ1
δ2
eh,el eh,eh
el ,ehel ,el
c
(p-q)γα
c
(p-q)α
Figure 3: Managerial eﬀort as a function of continuation payments under autarky
4.1.3 When can a conglomerate replicate the Stand-Alone benchmark?
We are now ready to answer our initial question: when can a conglomerate replicate the
Stand-Alone benchmark, i.e. the outcome where there is no redistribution and attain the
benchmark value V SA? In order to replicate the benchmark, the headquarter must solve the
following optimisation program:
max
δ1,δ2,W1,W2
p2(C1(δ1) +C2(δ2)) + p(1− p)C1(δ1) + (1− p)pC2(δ2) (13)
subject to:
C1(δ1) ≥ L1(W1)
C2(δ2) ≥ L2(W2) (Continuation Constraints)
C1(δ1) ≥ C2(δ2)−W1
C2(δ2) ≥ C1(δ1)−W2 (Transfer Constraint)
δ1 ≥ c(p−q)γα
δ2 ≥ c(p−q)α
(Incentive Constraints)
The headquarters objective function consists of four terms that reßect i) the four contin-
gencies at the interim stage, ii) the transfer decision taken at that stage and iii) the managerial
eﬀort level in the Þrst production period. For example the second term p(1− p)C1(δ1) is the
expected proÞt in the case that only division 1 succeeds, that division 1 is continued and that
both managers exert a high eﬀort level.
The Þrst four constraints reßect the headquarters transfer policy, here no-redistribution,
at the interim stage. The last two constraints are the incentive constraints for the divisional
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The conglomerate does as well as the
Stand-Alone benchmark
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Figure 4: A conglomerate with autarkic divisions can never do better than the Stand-Alone
benchmark
managers. To attain the benchmark value V SA the headquarter must induce a high eﬀort level
from both managers with the eﬃcient, i.e. Second Best, continuation payment δ1 =
c
(p−q)γα
and δ2 =
c
(p−q)α . Given that headquarter optimally maximises the golden parachute for
both managers, W1 =W2 = 1, the transfer constraint then gives the following result.
Proposition 4 A conglomerate that operates a no-transfer policy can only do as well a cor-
responding portfolio of Stand-Alone Þrms, i.e. attain the benchmark value V SA, iﬀ the het-
erogeneity across divisions is not too strong γ ≤ 1 + 1α .
Figure 4 illustrates the result. Note that for a conglomerate with autarkic divisions it be-
come more diﬃcult to do as well as the Stand-Alone benchmark when the overall productivity
increases.
The proposition illustrates the negative side of having an internal capital market. There
exists a tension between the incentives for divisional managers and the incentives for the
headquarter to redistribute funds. Should the headquarter want to keep the division separate
and commit to a no-transfer policy then he must obtain a similar net continuation proÞt from
both divisions. Otherwise, there is an incentive for redistribution should a less proÞtable
division fail. But since net continuation proÞts depend on the incentive payment to managers,
there is now a strong restriction on the incentive payments the headquarter can make. In order
to attain the benchmark value of 2 stand-alone divisions, each manager must be induced to
work hard. If now for example division 1 is a lot more proÞtable, i.e. γ > 1+ 1α , then manager
1 must be paid more than the eﬃcient, Second Best, continuation payment δSB1 =
c
(p−q)γα
in order to satisfy the transfer constraints. But since more is paid to manager 1 than is
necessary to induce a high eﬀort, not because the headquarter induces the manager of the
more proÞtable division to work harder but in order to make the no-transfer policy credible,
there is a loss in Þrm value.
4.1.4 Full characterisation with autarkic divisions
Note that proposition 4 only tells us when the conglomerate, by choosing not use the internal
capital market, can do as well as the portfolio of two Þrms with one division each. The propo-
14
sition is not a full characterisation of the optimisation program nor does the optimisation
program fully describe the no-transfer case.
As we have seen in proposition 4, when the headquarter wants to implement the no-
transfer policy, it must be optimal to reÞnance the less productive division when this division
is the sole division that succeeds. In other words, the net continuation value of division
2 should be greater than the net continuation value of division 1 net of the payment to
manager 2 if his division is successful but not reÞnanced. The relevant transfer constraint of
the problem is the second one: C2 ≥ C1 −W2. To satisfy this constraint, the headquarter
has three possibilities. First, he could increase the payment to manager 2 when his successful
division is liquidated. But the headquarter cannot pay more than what he has. W2 cannot
exceed the liquidation value of division 220. Second, the headquarter could decrease the net
continuation proÞt of the most proÞtable division by paying the manager more than what he
needs to do a high eﬀort. Increasing δ1 above δ
SB
1 decreases the proÞt in division 1 and hence
makes continuation of this division less attractive. Last, the headquarter could increase the
net continuation value of the less productive division by decreasing the payment δ2 to the
manager. But a decrease in δ2 implies that the incentive constraint of the second manager
will no longer be satisÞed and the manager of the less productive division will not work hard.
And hence, if the headquarter decides to decrease δ2, it will be set at its lowest possible value:
δ2 = 0.
When the conglomerate does not have the benchmark value V SA, if the headquarter wants
to implement the no-transfer policy at the interim stage, he should either over-compensate
the Þrst manager or rely on a low eﬀort from the second manager (or both). In appendix A,
we compare the beneÞts, in term of conglomerate value, of these strategies and the results
are summarized in a proposition:
Proposition 5 Under autarky, the headquarter induces both managers to work hard if either
the overall productivity is suﬃciently high, α ≥ 2( cp−q )( pp−q ), or if the extra productivity of
division 1 is suﬃciently low, γ ≤ (1 + p−qp ) + (1 − cp−q ) 1α . If not, then only the manager of
the more proÞtable division works hard.21
Figure 5 illustrates the proposition.
What is the intuition for that result, which is surprising given that managers are autarkic
(remember that in the Stand-Alone benchmark, both managers always work hard)?
We need to explain why the headquarter does better with a low eﬀort from manager
2 when there is little overall proÞtability but a lot of heterogeneity. In that case there is
big diﬀerence in the gross continuation value between division 1 and division 2. If both
managers were to work hard then only way to achieve equal net values is to give away the
extra proÞtability of division 1 to its manager.22 Given that division 1 is quite a bit more
proÞtable than division 2, giving away the extra proÞtability of division 1 is very costly. A
cheaper way is to have the manager of division 2 work little. True, this means that division
2 will be less often continued but that division is not very proÞtable, relative to division 1,
anyway. What matters more for headquarter is that since manager 2 is no longer given a
share of his division, the net value of division 2 increases which in turn eases the transfer
constraint and allows headquarter to proÞt more from the strong division 1.
20
21The corresponding incentive contracts can be found in the derivation of the solution in appendix A.
22The headquarter cannot raise the net value of division 2 by reducing δ2 since its manager must be induced
to work hard.
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